Kampala- On November 26th 1977 White Rhodesia woke up to the news that on November 23rd at a quarter to eight in the morning, White Rhodesian security forces launched Operation Dingo, a combined air and ground attack against Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe Africa National Liberation Army (ZANLA) camps at Chiomio and Tembue in Mozambique ninety kilometers away from the Zimbabwean border. Ten aircraft and two hundred ground troops were set against 10,000 ZANLA forces. (Rhodesian SAS Troopers Below)
White Rhodesian forces hit the camp with a wave of bombers, which were followed by helicopter gunships before prepositioned ground troops drawn from the Rhodesian SAS and the Rhodesian Light Infantry finished off those who the planes and the gunships had not killed. When the dust and the smoke cleared, there were three thousand confirmed ZANLA dead and as many as five thousand wounded. Two days later, on November 25th the smaller camp of Tembue was hit. After action reports indicated the body count could have been higher had there been more ground troops assigned to the mission.
In military terms, Operation Dingo is an example of perfect planning and flawless execution. In the planning and execution all nine principles of war, mass, clarity of objective, surprise, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security and simplicity were held to a tee and the results were clear. Rhodesian security forces deployed ninety kilometers outside Rhodesia killed three thousand combatants, losing two of their number and in the process putting the fear of God in ZANLA.
On December 14th 2008 Ugandans woke up to the news that the regional governments Uganda, DR Congo and Southern Sudan had launched Operation Lightning Thunder to put paid to the Kony menace Unlike White Rhodesia three decades earlier Uganda was not celebrating success, it was full of questions. By far the most disturbing picture was of a group of armed men standing before basins, jerry cans, plastic chairs and a guitar items which allegedly belonged to Joseph Kony. As a country we were hoping that the UPDF had finally killed or captured Kony as opposed to capturing his Kaunda suit.
The ground combat element, a key component of the entire operation did not make their objective in time because they were slowed down by a combination of bad weather and difficult terrain. The challenges presented as reasons could have been reasonably been anticipated. At H-hour, what should have been a thunderous concentrated blow was an effort devoid of focus and thus potency.
The failure to mass firepower has been blamed largely on the weather, the rain and the attendant fog and low lying clouds had delayed the aerial attack. General Tinyefuza in his impassioned article argued we had and still have no control over the weather. He argues Uganda did not have a meteorology department in Garamba and neither did the DRC. With all due respect to the general that argument has no legs.http://www.independent.co.ug/cover-story/531-tinyefuza-tells-off-generals-on-garamba-attack
Granted, the attack was launched in what is the dry season for that part of Congo however, based on data available in the public domain, Garamba national park (see aerial picture below) receives 1260MM of rainfall annually. Uganda as a whole receives 1574 mm of rainfall annually. The argument I am making is, that it rained in Garamba that day, should not have come as a surprise to anyone. The attendant fog and low cloud cover that delayed the deployment of the fighter planes should have been factored into the operational plans.
A combination of the terrain and the weather also hampered the ground combat element. The average soldier can walk six kilometers per hour carrying full combat gear over relatively even ground. The terrain in Garamba is characterized by forest, swamp and or savannah covered by high elephant grass. Even without the rain, which turned the ground into a soggy, jellylike mess it would have been impossible for the ground combat element to reach their objective in time. (Ugandan troops in Congo below)
Still on the issue of the weather General Tinyefuza argues, First of all, it is not true that an army can have 100 per cent certainty on weather conditions even when they use meteorologists. You can see how Israel today is facing problems in bombing Gaza because of unforeseen weather conditions. During the Gulf War in 1991, US forces had to suspend bombing for seven days until weather conditions improved. Besides, Uganda could not have had a meteorology department in Garamba. DRC does not have one either. But when Plan A could not work, we employed Plan B. That is why we had contingency plans to substitute MiGs with helicopter gunships in the initial assault on Garamba. (A road in Democratic Republic Congo below)
First off, MIG -21 fishbed planes were designed as fighters, which is they went head to head against other planes and interceptors, which is they went head to head against bombers. The other way of putting this is they were not specifically designed to destroy targets on the ground. The then Soviet Union had used them with limited success in Afghanistan in the 70’s and 80’s which in part led to the design of the SU-25 frogfoot (see picture) a pure ground attack plane. The limitation of the MIGs was immediately apparent; with a high operating ceiling somewhere in the region of 2000m they were not very useful because fog and low lying clouds limited their operational capabilities. Furthermore in a ground attack role, MIG-21 planes carry 1.5 tons of ordnance, compare that with the SU-25 which carries 5 tons of ordnance. The MIG-21 was not the best weapon system for a ground attack mission.
Attack helicopters or gunships are a valuable asset, Uganda’s principle gunship is the MI-24 Hind, and it is an impressive weapon by all accounts. However, according to the Military Balance a publication by the prestigious International Institute for Strategic Studies, Uganda has six gunships with only two (2) being functional. The other four are part of the flawed procurement process (junk chopper scandal).
This begs the question, even with its impressive capabilities how would two gunships deliver the firepower necessary to destroy the three camps lighting thunder was targeting? It may be argued that the other helicopter assets such as the MI-8 hip can be fitted for fire support missions but their pay load which affects the amount of firepower they can bring to bear is limited because they are primarily troop carriers.
We are familiar with the well-worn cliché the best coaches and players are always in the stands and that is why I have limited my critique to facts and information that was available at the time the operation was launched. A failure to bring all the firepower to bear at H-hour meant the UPDF was simply not in a position to hammer Kony decisively.
wow!
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