Death in the skies, death from the skies.

Kampala- Ugandas participation on the Somalia mission has not been without controversy. From the outset, it has been classed as nothing more than an attempt by the present government to curry favor with the powers that be. While I have my issues with respect to solving the Somali problem, we are where we are and, the benefits to the UPDF in terms of broadening and deepening their skill set have been immense.

So it was with great fanfare that the air component was flagged off from Soroti flying school. Three attack helicopters and one utility helicopter were flagged off for Somalia. Monday brought with it the sad news that three of the four choppers were missing, pretty soon the worst was confirmed, they had gone down on or around the mountains outside Nanyuki Airbase.

At a personal level, the loss to the families cannot be comprehended, death comes to us all but this is a massive, massive blow. The skill set that has gone down with those men is also something that will be sorely missed. However, in the grand scheme of things skills and equipment can be replaced, it will take time but they will be replaced. 

The number one question on all our minds is what happened? by far the most cogent answer has come from Mike Mukula who argued the route chosen was less than ideal in fact the route chosen was a disaster in the making. Why? The service ceiling for the choppers in question is 4500M, at its highest point Mount Kenya is 5200M, basic maths tells you the rest.

Over and above the issue of the service ceiling, is the fact that flying through mountains is a challenge even for the most experienced pilots. At high altitudes engine performance suffers, thin mountain air affects the ability of most aircraft to gain and maintain altitude. It is not uncommon for older helicopters to stall in midair at high altitudes.

To compensate for this most fliers do one of two things. They derate the engines by this we mean the engines are tuned in such a way that they can operate optimally in suboptimal conditions.

Apart from derating the engines, some of them go ahead to tweak the power to weight ratios, by this we mean they use engines far more powerful in comparison to the weight they will be carrying. The net effect of these changes is, in the thin mountain air the helicopters are able to fly. 

What was the status of this equipment? Were the machines kitted out for high altitude flying?  What about the men? Were they prepared for the physical and physiological impact of high altitude flying?

The Chief of Land forces has gone on record to say the route chosen was reconnoitred in detail, I have no reason to believe he is lying, but as any soldier will tell you, more often than not, there is a huge difference between our assumptions and plans and the reality on the ground. The cost the institution has paid in blood and equipment is pretty high, our only prayer is that the lessons learnt, any lessons learnt will be put to good use.

 

Afrika Mashariki the 411

Kampala-  It has been a bit since I last wrote, I traded in one capitalist jockey for another and this one has me running on cylinders, well as many cylinders as a horse could possibly have. In the time I have not been writing much has happened.

Al Shabab is having its clock cleaned in Somalia. Joseph Kabila is doing a hapless impression of being the president of all of DRC. Still on the DRC, the army has had its butt kicked by some chaps with a name that paints a mental image of a street gang not a revolutionary army. 

In Kenya some chap called Miguna Miguna ( this guys parents are wierd) kicked off something of a shit storm by giving his two cents worth on the political elite. The bazinga (thanks Sheldon) is the William Ruto is a man worthy of being president and Mwai Kibaki inspite of his advanced age is something of a crocodile. Patient in the extreme and unlielding in his negotiations, I guess the grandfather image thing is just to lull his opponents into a false sense of safety. And yes you guessed it Raila is a political clown who has a thing against note takers......go figure.

Closer to home the hits just keep on coming for the government. The vicious one-two combinations have the ruling party reeling as they lose one by election after the other. Then, clearly we have over paid for national ID cards and by over paid I am just being silly, these German chaps and their Ugandan cohorts have mugged us economically four hundred IDs produced at a cost of 100M Dollars. The good times keep on coming, for our economic stick up men at least. 

Thats the 411 on Africa Mashariki,  SSDC Same Script Different Cast or as my 'French' speaking friends would say Same Shit Different Day SSDD.  I have to run now, the jockey calls.........

Bashir and Kiir, Once more into the breach.

Does every Sudanese peace treaty have within it the seeds of future conflict? Looking at the analysis of the  events in Sudan right now, the talking heads seem to believe the incomplete nature of the Comprehensive Peace Accord of  2005  is the cause of the present conflagration .http://www.cfr.org/africa/defuse-sudan-conflict/p28072

I disagree, firstly for grammatical reasons. I am not sure how comprehensive and incomplete can be used to refer to the same object. But more to the point,  this war serves as cathartic release for both presidents who are faced with daunting social and economic problems. War in this case is a distraction, a side show an  attempt to externalize the enemy.

The last time a Sudanese President found himself caught between the pincers of societal change and a woeful economic situation, he set Sudan on the path to war. That president was Jaffar Nimeiry and the year was 1984. A drought had decimated the food producing regions, the Arab world was riding a wave of piety and there was very little he could do to dam the tide.

So, he gave in to the Islamists and Sharia law became the governing  law over Sudan. He did put in some caveats with respect to the south but the arrow of rebellion had been loosed. The rest as they say is history.   A young Colonel called John Garang was sent to put down a mutiny and somewhere along the way he decided it was easier to fight a long civil war than put down a mutiny.

The point of the foregoing is not to be fillip about things, but to bring to the fore the fact that war with the south has been the one thing the northern Arab Islamist elite have agreed upon.  

Bashir and Nimeiry share similar circumstances,  Sudan has not been immune to the winds of the Arab spring, with its dual heritage, not quite Arab not quite African and yet fully human, the aspirations of the human heart for a more egalitarian society cannot be stilled. Egypt, Tunisia and indeed Libya  have shown the weakness of a system kept in power by force and patronage in the face of people power. Sudan's Bashir  is on increasingly shaky ground.

In Africa, the key use of government revenue is oiling the patronage system. For Bashir's Sudan, the loss of oil revenue which accounted for as much as 75% of government revenue has had the net effect of opening up the schisms within the National Congress Party (NCP). With much less money to go around the internal jockeying for position has intensified.

Quite apart from oiling the system, a small portion of government revenue goes toward the basic functions of government. In most African states government consumption is a large part of the economy, with reduced government expenditure and consumption  the knock on effects across the economy cannot be ignored. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSUDAN/Resources/Sudan_Economic_Brief-Dec_2011.pdf

Closer to home. Salva Kiir is probably feeling the post secession post independence strain. In his book Anthills of the Savannah Chinua Achebe captured the angst of post independence leaders. That moment in time when the enormity of the task at hand and the paucity of their skill set meet with a resounding clash.

The post Independence euphoria is like an opiate slowly wearing  off, being replaced by the pain of a non existent state infrastructure expected to deliver without the benefit of a learning curve. No roads, no schools, no hospitals, no civil service and the weight of the aspirations of nine million people. It must be hot under that signature stetson.

Bashir and Kiir find themselves strangely united in the need for war, the one thing they were both fairly good at. War serves as a diversion, it allows both sides a common external enemy they can both focus on, blame and harangue for their failures.

Enter Uganda the regional enforcer, the Kony bogeyman serves Juba more than it serves Khartoum. Why would Bashir provide a rallying point for Juba and Kampala? The different messages being sent out by the Chief of Defense forces and the Minister of Defense in the issue of Sudan may be seen as Uganda hedging its bets, I say stay out of the game altogether. This fray will have no winners, this fray will be long and drawn out because neither party has what it takes to deliver a killing blow.

As a country we have no vital interests to protect, at least none that can be protected through the deployment of forces in Sudan. Our best bet is do what we can to make sure Southern Sudan survives as a state, short of committing blood and boots.

Kony is already Famous

Kampala Uganda- A few days ago I was having a conversation with Gari a friend of mine. As we talked she brought up the Kony 2012 video and asked me what my thoughts were. Off the bat, I said, I did not think an internet video was going to do anything.

http://www.kony2012.com/
To the best of my knowledge, Kony lives in a jungle somewhere in Congo at the rate at which the UPDF has been capturing his Kaunda suits he must be down to the dresses that also form part of his wardrobe.  There are many problems with the Kony 2012 video, and, far more qualified people than me have made their position on that very clear. However, the one thing I take issue with is how the video can take something as complex as the conflict in Northern Uganda and reduce it to bubble gum.http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/07/guest_post_joseph_kony_is_not_in_uganda_and_other_complicated_things

Furthermore to the people behind Invisible Children, who the hell do you think you are? From your video, it is clear you know next to nothing about the situation in Uganda in general and Northern Uganda in particular. The issue with Joseph Kony has roots far deeper than anything you have attempted to capture and this video is going to do next to nothing to solve.http://www.good.is/post/don-t-reduce-uganda-to-a-meme/

The Manichean prism of good versus evil completely ignores the fact that Kony is not an aberration. He is a product of a political system in which Socio political violence; even extreme violence is the norm. A hard core example of the Maoist maxim ‘political power grows out of the barrel of a gun’.

Why the focus on Kony? He is just one man. There are millions of people whose lives he has touched in the worst possible way, millions of people to whom he need not be introduced because he is already famous, who could use some help getting back on their feet.

Take one look at the people we are supposed to pressure to take action. There is not a single African leader not Kofi Annan, Nelson Mandela, Graca Machel, Desmond Tutu, Thabo Mbeki or Wole Soyinka. Not Wyre, Youssou Ndour, Angelique Kidjo or our very own Juliana Kanyomozi.

Somehow, Lady Gaga who thinks meat is clothing , Rush Limbaugh who believes/ believed LRA are a Christian outfit and the deployment of the US Special Forces advisers was an attempt by Obama to persecute Christians  are supposed to make a compelling case against  Kony.

That said, now with all the sound and fury around this video maybe we can have a real conversation about Uganda in particular and Africa

Black Gold

Kampala- On the twelfth February this year the president of Uganda gave a speech, a long speech about the state of play in Uganda’s nascent oil sector and his view of the state of play in Uganda in general. His announcement that he had instructed the energy minister to conclude the agreements with Tullow Oil had the talking heads moving at flank speed.http://www.chimpreports.com/index.php/special-reports/3924-m7-full-speech-on-oil.html

Parliament, under some dubious interpretation of their powers had placed a moratorium on agreements in the oil sector pending the passing of new oil laws. To the best of my knowledge the agreements were not negotiated in a legal vacuum, the guiding framework was the Petroleum act of 1985 and 2000 when they are referring to oil laws what exactly would they be referring to?

Parliament having more than its fair share of lawyers, and a disproportionately high number of senior six and senior six equivalency members should have known that you cannot shift goal posts, we as a county cannot retrospectively apply the law. Put differently, we cannot negotiate these same agreements under a new legal framework without exposing ourselves to more litigation than we could possibly afford to pay for both in financial terms and reputation terms.

As an individual, I put no stock in the parliamentary resolution because I am convinced beyond any doubt, reasonable or unreasonable, the documentation that informed the decision to freeze the agreement with Tullow was questionable. No, make that forged.

For anyone who seriously thought this deal would not go forward there may be a few things they missed.  First off, I would be hard pressed to believe that the person of the president would allow oil production to take off his stay in power. From the tone of this speech and other speeches one would be forgiven for believing this government created the oil and placed it in the Albertine graben. Never mind the fact that part of the legal framework used to negotiate these agreements predates their time in power.

 So, there is the element of one upsmanship, a competition some would say needless between this government and those that came before it. Throw in the messianic mindset of most of those who bleed yellow and it was a safe bet that this deal was going ahead.

The other issue is the Bashir factor and the Gadaffi factor. Omar El Bashir can thank the Chinese for his longevity in power, as long as the Chinese were dependent on ‘his’ oil they were prepared to provide him with political cover.  Gadaffi on the other hand had no significant godfather; he had forgotten that he was a bit player on the international scene. Having a few African countries and minor kings willing to drink your bathwater does not translate to juice on the international scene.

Love him or hate him, our president is a shrewd political operator, he can within reason count on the support of the Americans. The Europeans have been a problem but, Tullow is Anglo Irish so the Brits can be counted on to be less hostile and now he has two new best friends the Chinese (CNOOC) and the French (TOTAL). It cannot hurt to have four of the five permanent members of the Security Council looking at you through rose tinted lenses.

The wild card in all this is the fact that our president is a democrat. I am being serious he is a democrat. In the last elections the vast majority of Ugandans ceded their power to him for the duration of five years. His actions are in essence an expression of the will of the majority of Ugandans. His mindset can perhaps be best explained in the words of his fellow revolutionary and democrat Jacob Zuma who in a speech to the Judiciary in July 2011 said ‘The Executive, as elected officials, has the sole discretion to decide policies for Government. This means that once government has decided on the appropriate policies, the judiciary cannot, when striking down legislation or parts thereof on the basis of illegality, raise that as an opportunity to change the policies as determined by the Executive area of government.

http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/president-zuma-and-the-separation-of-powers/

He went on to say ‘The Executive must be allowed to conduct its administration and policy making work as freely as it possibly can. The powers conferred on the courts cannot be superior to the powers resulting from the political and consequently administrative mandate resulting from popular democratic elections. Political disputes resulting from the exercise of powers that have been constitutionally conferred on the ruling party through a popular vote must not be subverted, simply because those who disagree with the ruling party politically, and who cannot win the popular vote during elections, feel other arms of the State are avenues to help them co-govern the country. This interferes with the independence of the judiciary. Political battles must be fought on political platforms. http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/president-zumas-keynote-address-to-access-to-justice-conference/

Political battles must be fought on political platforms.

Why Operation Lighting Thunder Failed.

Kampala- On November 26^th  1977 White Rhodesia woke up to the news that on November 23^rd  at a quarter to eight in the morning, White Rhodesian security forces launched Operation Dingo, a combined air and ground attack against Robert Mugabe’s  Zimbabwe Africa National Liberation Army (ZANLA) camps at Chiomio and Tembue in Mozambique ninety kilometers away from the Zimbabwean border. Ten aircraft and two hundred ground troops were set against 10,000 ZANLA forces. (Rhodesian SAS Troopers Below)

White Rhodesian forces hit the camp with a wave of bombers, which were followed by helicopter gunships  before prepositioned ground troops drawn from the Rhodesian SAS and the Rhodesian Light Infantry finished off those who the planes and the gunships had not killed. When the dust and the smoke cleared, there were three thousand confirmed ZANLA dead and as many as five thousand wounded. Two days later, on November 25^th the smaller camp of Tembue was hit. After action reports indicated the body count could have been higher had there been more ground troops assigned to the mission.

In military terms, Operation Dingo is an example of perfect planning and flawless execution. In the planning and execution all nine principles of war, mass, clarity of objective, surprise, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security and simplicity were held to a tee and the results were clear. Rhodesian security forces deployed ninety kilometers outside Rhodesia killed three thousand combatants, losing two of their number and in the process putting the fear of God in ZANLA.

On December 14^th 2008 Ugandans woke up to the news that the regional governments Uganda, DR Congo and Southern Sudan had launched Operation Lightning Thunder to put paid to the Kony menace Unlike White Rhodesia three decades earlier Uganda was not celebrating success, it was full of questions.  By far the most disturbing picture was of a group of armed men standing before basins, jerry cans, plastic chairs and a guitar items which allegedly belonged to Joseph Kony. As a country we were hoping that the UPDF had finally killed or captured Kony as opposed to capturing his Kaunda suit.

Why did Uganda fail where Rhodesia succeeded? The key failure was a failure of mass. Where Rhodesian Security Forces were able to concentrate all their firepower on a single target at a specific time, UPDF applied force in a piece meal fashion. Operation Lightning Thunder failed because the UPDF did not apply firepower in a concentrated manner. The  fighter jets were not designed for ground attack and the helicopter assets were insufficient.

The ground combat element, a key component of the entire operation did not make their objective in time because they were slowed down by a combination of bad weather and difficult terrain. The challenges presented as reasons could have been reasonably been anticipated. At H-hour, what should have been a thunderous concentrated blow was an effort devoid of focus and thus potency. 

The failure to mass firepower has been blamed largely on the weather, the rain and the attendant fog and low lying clouds had delayed the aerial attack. General Tinyefuza in his impassioned article argued we had and still have no control over the weather.  He argues Uganda did not have a meteorology department in Garamba and neither did the DRC. With all due respect to the general that argument has no legs.http://www.independent.co.ug/cover-story/531-tinyefuza-tells-off-generals-on-garamba-attack

Granted, the attack was launched in what is the dry season for that part of Congo however, based on data available in the public domain, Garamba national park (see aerial picture below) receives 1260MM of rainfall annually. Uganda as a whole receives 1574 mm of rainfall annually. The argument I am making is, that it rained in Garamba that day, should not have come as a surprise to anyone. The attendant fog and low cloud cover that delayed the deployment of the fighter planes should have been factored into the operational plans.

A combination of the terrain and the weather also hampered the ground combat element. The average soldier can walk six kilometers per hour carrying full combat gear over relatively even ground. The terrain in Garamba is characterized by forest, swamp and or savannah covered by high elephant grass. Even without the rain, which turned the ground into a soggy, jellylike mess it would have been impossible for the ground combat element to reach their objective in time. (Ugandan troops in Congo below)

Still on the issue of the weather General Tinyefuza argues, First of all, it is not true that an army can have 100 per cent certainty on weather conditions even when they use meteorologists. You can see how Israel today is facing problems in bombing Gaza because of unforeseen weather conditions. During the Gulf War in 1991, US forces had to suspend bombing for seven days until weather conditions improved. Besides, Uganda could not have had a meteorology department in Garamba. DRC does not have one either. But when Plan A could not work, we employed Plan B. That is why we had contingency plans to substitute MiGs with helicopter gunships in the initial assault on Garamba. (A road in Democratic Republic Congo below)

First off, MIG -21 fishbed planes were designed as fighters, which is they went head to head against other planes and interceptors, which is they went head to head against bombers.  The other way of putting this is they were not specifically designed to destroy targets on the ground. The then Soviet Union had used them with limited success in Afghanistan in the 70’s and 80’s which in part led to the design of the SU-25 frogfoot (see picture) a pure ground attack plane. The limitation of the MIGs was immediately apparent; with a high operating ceiling somewhere in the region of 2000m they were not very useful because fog and low lying clouds limited their operational capabilities.  Furthermore in a ground attack role, MIG-21 planes carry 1.5 tons of ordnance, compare that with the SU-25 which carries 5 tons of ordnance.  The MIG-21 was not the best weapon system for a ground attack mission.

Attack helicopters or gunships are a valuable asset, Uganda’s principle gunship is the MI-24 Hind, and it is an impressive weapon by all accounts. However, according to the Military Balance a publication by the prestigious International Institute for Strategic Studies, Uganda has six gunships with only two (2) being functional. The other four are part of the flawed procurement process (junk chopper scandal).

This begs the question, even with its impressive capabilities how would two gunships deliver the firepower necessary to destroy the three camps lighting thunder was targeting? It may be argued that the other helicopter assets such as the MI-8 hip can be fitted for fire support missions but their pay load which affects the amount of firepower they can bring to bear is limited because they are primarily troop carriers.

We are familiar with the well-worn cliché the best coaches and players are always in the stands and that is why I have limited my critique to facts and information that was available at the time the operation was launched. A failure to bring all the firepower to bear at H-hour meant the UPDF was simply not in a position to hammer Kony decisively. 

Operation Lightning Thunder.

Kampala - It was meant to be our finest hour, a lightning fast air raid followed by a thunderous blow from elements of the Special Forces. A Uganda Peoples Defense forces (UPDF) air-ground taskforce equipped with fighter planes, attack helicopters and elite forces, poised to deliver a telling blow to the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) a rebel force equipped with nothing more than assault rifles, razor sharp machetes and a potent ideological mix of traditional religion and an insane reinterpretation of the Bible and the Ten Commandments.

The LRA has proved to be resilient, while several armed groups have come and gone, the LRA has persisted. Carefully reading the geopolitical signs, it has survived by remaining relevant to one destabilizing agenda after another. And, in that time has built a gruesome reputation founded on kidnap, the venerable AK- 47 assault rifle and razor sharp machetes.   

The protagonists were thus not unfamiliar with each other, having been locked in a macabre embrace for more than two decades.

Zero hour

December 14^th 2008, in a tent somewhere in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Operation Lighting Thunder planning staff are only mildly anxious as they pore over maps of North Eastern Congo. Outside; mechanics obsessively check the planes and the helicopters.

Men from the newly formed Special Forces Group in full battle gear stand  in groups checking and rechecking their rifles. The air is tense. They will be inserted into battle by helicopters, they are the lucky ones, somewhere in the vastness beyond several companies of men, the blocking force, are walking to the objective.

The weather has cast a deciding vote, it has been raining and there is thick fog, the Mig- 21 planes, the crucial first wave cannot deploy. In the tent, there is whispered talk about how the weather slowed down Operation Overlord the allied invasion of Europe and it turned out to be a success and how the air campaign in Gulf War One had been halted for a whole seven days because of bad weather.

The  mission commander asks his signaler to reach out to the blocking force, the report is not good, the rain has turned the ground into a gelatinous mess, they may not make the objective in time. The clock winds down.

The window of opportunity is slowly closing; mission command reaches out to the blocking force again what is their status. Progress is still slow they will not make the objective in time.

The meteorologist comes in, there is good news, the weather has cleared enough for the fighter’s to be launched. The mission commander calls a meeting attendees are the air wing commander, the ground forces commander, the operation intelligence officer and lays the options on the table; the ground component will not be in place in time. The weather has cleared enough for them to launch the fighters, the new plan is air assets only. 

Without the ground troops there is a real chance Kony will escape into the vastness of Garamba. An attack from the air will deprive him of food and shelter and may kill off some of his forces. Furthermore there is no telling what vindictive, retributive wrath he will unleash upon the people of north eastern Congo. Will this constitute victory?

There is silence around the table, each of these men know this is not only about killing Kony, it is one the most important auditions in their lives, it is about proving the post- Luwero generation of officers and men have what it takes. It is also about proving that the new bi service model of the UPDF can work.

After Action report.

A lot has been written about that day December 14 2008, the mission failed in its cardinal aim killing Joseph Kony and yet it was a success in the sense that it showed all and sundry that Uganda has evolving capabilities, there is no such thing as a safe haven.

Why talk about this operation three year after the fact? In 2008 the Americans offered technical and financial support, in 2011 they have offered boots on the ground, the Chinese have offered money some would say a violation of their long held tenet of non-interference and the Europeans have offered to build a base.

In 2011 the battle to end the Kony menace is a microcosm of the much wider battle between the US and China and to some extent the EU for what has been called the Post-American Era. In the second part of this is three part piece I will highlight the key failures of the initial strike in December 2008, and lastly I will address the current context in which we find ourselves.